Blackmore starts off by saying that the parapsych route away from naturalism is closed off because her own experiments failed to produce evidence. But she's demonstrably wrong here. Berger has published a fairly strong critique of her work, which failed to discuss the plethora of strong cases (references available upon request) and contains  methodological faults. See http://archived.parapsych.org/psiexplorer/blackmore_critique.htm

Blackmore has replied to Berger in an equally forceful paper. Her rejoinder contains some admittedly valid and worthy counterpoints, but she nonetheless admits the following: "in spite of Berger's numerous errors, I agree that one cannot draw conclusions about the reality of psi based on these [Blackmore's] experiments. The results are relevant to the problem of replicability in para- psychology, but as far as the reality of psi is concerned I draw only one conclusion: I don't know. [...] [Berger] has made numerous errors and has seriously misrepresented my work. Nevertheless, I am glad to be able to agree with his final conclusion—'that drawing any conclusions, positive or negative, about the reality of psi that are based on the Blackmore psi experiments must be considered unwarranted'" (See "A Critical Response to Rick Berger" at http://www.criticandokardec.com.br/blackmore.pdf)

Again, Blackmore is wrong about the issue of replicability in several areas (albeit not all, so she's not entirely wrong), but I would have to elaborate in a follow up comment to avoid making this one too long.

To avoid confusion, I don't think psi effects prove anything supernatural. Perhaps naturalism is compatible with psi effects, though we may end up having to expand our notion of "nature" and "physical" (which isn't meant to be a way of sneaking in anything beyond the physical). My point is, instead, that Blackmore is sadly being a bit dishonest here. I really like her, so it pains me to say this.

The following was originally meant to be a comment for the YouTube comment section , so PLEASE expect this to be pitiful when judged by academic standards! For academic standards, contact me.

==========================================

To whom it may concern, RE Braude vs Sudduth on survival vs living-agent psi:

UMBC Philosopher Stephen Braude's 2003 book "Immortal Remains" is an in depth philosophical analysis of the empirical arguments for postmortem survival in the form of trance mediumship, NDE/OBEs, alleged reincarnation, and heart/lung transplant cases. Much of the work discussed or alluded to was published by the British Society for Psychical Research (SPR) and its American branch (ASPR), both of which are still around today and whose members include skeptics and "believers" alike (e.g. arch-skeptic Richard Wiseman was a council member for the SPR for ten years...). Braude shows that, in the best cases (e.g. Kakie sittings and GP sittings among countless others) the mundane "usual suspects" of fraud, malobservation, etc. are unable to even "get a foot in the door." He then explores what he calls "exotic but non-paranormal" explanations in terms of latent savant-like talents that emerge (either only or mostly) in certain dissociative states. Here again Braude shows that the "best cases" can't be explained this way due to the fact (or very high likelihood) of anomalous information acquisition not mediated by the five senses. This leaves only two options:

Either:

A: Genuine instances of survival (with the surviving personality somehow interacting with the empirical world)

or

B: Psychic functioning among living persons that mimics or simulates the appearance of postmortem survival. LAP hypothesis or "super-psi" hypothesis, although the latter term is often taken to be pejorative and misleading. LAP arguments often overlap with arguments over Schizoaffective spectrum and/or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), especially in cases of trance mediumship. It can be argued that, in cases where "normal" non-survival explanations fail, it may still be the case that these personalities are the product of dissociative states that allow the use of latent psychic functioning, which together look an awful lot like someone is really getting intimate information from a departed loved on.

(NO, I am not saying that DID and schizophrenia are the same. Many people mistake the two. They're different conditions)

B comes in a variety of forms, and critics allege that it would require a degree of psi prowess that hasn't been demonstrated in non-survival contexts. Braude questions this claim but also shows that it wouldn't matter that much anyway. Even IF psychic functioning is less refined in all non-survival contexts, one can still argue that LAP is more plausible than actual survival. 

In studying the merits of LAP Braude did extensive research into DID and dissociation, resulting in both his book "First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind" (https://tinyurl.com/yyrsrzap) and his receiving the Distinguished Achievement Award from the International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation (you can find his name on their official web site; I'm too lazy to fetch it)

That aside, Braude ultimately ends up concluding that the scales are slightly tipped in favor of survival over LAP, but "it's not a slam-dunk."

ENTER SUDDUTH

Philosophy professor Michael Sudduth argues that survivalists implicitly presuppose certain "auxiliary assumptions" that they haven't shown to be plausible. As a result, among other things, Sudduth thinks that survivalists have not been able to rule out LAP as a competing explanation for the empirical observations. Sudduth himself specifically details (among others) the "34 veridical claims" in the kakie sittings and the impressive hits in the GP sittings. See his book "A Philosophical Critique of Empirical Arguments for Postmortem Survival." (https://tinyurl.com/y46bddqv)

To be sure, there are alleged survival cases that Sudduth wouldn't even want to invoke LAP for, and my above summary of his "Philosophical Critique" is pitiful given the rich and sophisticated content, but I'm not aware of any place where Sudduth has denied the existence of ESP/psi effects. On the contrary, in several places he seems to imply their existence. 

For example, in a blog entry in which he replies to survivalist Christ Carter, Sudduth writes,

[QUOTE] 

Most empirical survivalists, and Carter is no exception here, think it’s fairly clear that ordinary-psi cannot account for salient strands of evidence.  Hence, Carter speaks of “ESP of the required power and range” (emphasis mine). So survivalists tend to devote most of their energy to refuting the super-psi version of the LAP hypothesis. 

Now I’ve argued elsewhere (Sudduth 2013a, 2013b) that survivalists have not adequately grounded the ostensible requirement that psi be of a greater magnitude, potency, or refinement than ordinary-psi in order to pose a problem for survival arguments.  In this I’m preceded by and INDEBTED TO THE HIGH CALIBER WORK OF PHILOSOPHER STEPHEN BRAUDE (2003).  Part of the problem is that survivalists operate with an implausibly narrow conception of how living-agent psi would challenge empirical arguments for survival, and this is often further based on a weak grasp of the content of the LAP hypothesis.  I’ve tried to show how ORDINARY-PSI DOES INDEED pose a challenge to classical empirical survival arguments. This is particularly acute when survival arguments are formulated along Bayesian lines and propose a conclusion about the net plausibility of the survival hypothesis based on the extent to which the survival hypothesis leads us to expect the data, the extent to which the data are otherwise not to be expected, and the initial credibility of the survival hypothesis. 

[END QUOTE, caps added for emphasis. see  http://michaelsudduth.com/chris-carters-challenge-survival-vs-super-psi/]

Here Sudduth not only praises Braude but also implicitly accepts psi, at least for the sake of argument.

In a 2019 interview with  Carlos Alvarado, Sudduth says, "I also benefited from a decade of conversations with parapsychologists and fellow philosophers who have worked and published on this topic. I’ve also joined parapsychologists on some field investigations over the years (with Loyd Auerbach, for example), and I’ve critically examined mediums firsthand. I'VE ALSO PERSONALLY EXPERIENCED a broad range of ostensibly paranormal phenomena." (caps added). See https://tinyurl.com/y3vhwuf8

Finally, see Sudduth's 2009 paper "Super-psi and the Survivalist Interpretation of Mediumship" at michaelsudduth.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/jse_23_2_sudduth.pdf . From the abstract:

[QUOTE] According to the survivalist interpretation of mediumship, the existence of discarnate persons provides the best explanation for the data associated with physical and mental mediumship.  Others—advocates of what is often called the “super-psi hypothesis”—maintain that the data of mediumship may be at least equally explained in terms of living agent psi (ESP and psychokinesis).  Many defenders of the survivalist interpretation of mediumship attempt to deflate the alleged explanatory virtues of the super-psi hypothesis by arguing that the hypothesis is unfalsifiable and lacks independent evidential support.  My central contention in this paper is that these frequently encountered survivalist criticisms of the super-psi hypothesis are ultimately self-defeating to the case for survival from mediumship.  To show this I first argue in some detail that the survivalist interpretation of mediumship is committed to a kind or degree of psi that is indistinguishable from what is required by the super-psi hypothesis.  From this vantage point it can be shown that any attempt to impugn the explanatory virtues of the super-psi hypothesis on account of the kind or degree of psi it requires undercuts the argument for survival itself. [END OF QUOTATION] 

 Internet atheists: Atheists don't say "there IS no god;" we simply lack belief, but we're not making any affirmative/positive claims, so we don't have a burden. In contrast you make a positive claim ("theism is true") requiring evidence and/or (depending on your definition of "evidence") (a) syllogism(s) which conclude(s) "therefore (some form of) theism is true."

Also internet atheists: In the same way that you lack belief in fairies, or in unicorns, or in Zeus.

Everyone else: ..... 

Internet atheists: ”what? Dawkinskraussdennetthitchensharris.”

Everyone else: Well, since we know (or at the very least have very good reasons for saying) that there are NO unicorns or fairies etc, then by drawing an an analogy between classical theism and fairies you are implicitly claiming that we likewise know (or have very good reasons for saying) that classical theism is false. That's more than merely "lacking belief;" that's a positive claim! Atheist and agnostic philosophers of religion who are knowledgeable of this field are more precise and less confusing in their terminology. 

Internet Atheists: DAWKINS DAWKINS DAWKINS!!! 😡

This is going to sound smug. Don't care. 

Every idea we encounter is filtered through a set of theoretical lenses that are crafted through personal experiences, upbringing, culture, and formal education. It's a frustrating trend for people to conflate their lenses with "THE" truth, without realizing that they're applying more scrutiny to new or counter ideas -- turning that skeptical dial up more to these "different" ideas-- than they are to their own model(s) of reality. This is also oddly true for people formally-educated in one area addressing ideas in a separate area. We often don't see or grasp how ignorant we are and how worthwhile the counter-arguments are. 

This is painfully obvious in philosophy of religion and certain ("controversial") areas of scientific inquiry:

-- There are worthwhile philosophical arguments for (at least classical) theism (by e.g. Hart, Feser, Kerr, Fradd, Rasmussen, Koons, Pruss, Loke, and, yes, even WL Craig... etc.), and of course there are worthwhile critiques and rejoinders (Oppy, Malpass, Fodor, Mackie, Rowe, Grayling, Morriston, etc), but most people don't know the literature. At all. That's fine, actually; no problem. The problem comes in when people smugly, obnoxiously, and authoritatively PRONOUNCE on issues they don't know anything about. So many people (believers and doubters alike) have no clue about this literature, and so they routinely raise ridiculous arguments and objections. Many believers will smugly argue for "God" with pseudo syllogisms that would make knowledgeable 7th graders blush. But the same is true of the anti-theistic arguments made by so many atheists (e.g. "who made God?" or "special pleading exemption for requiring a cause of his own" or "God's alleged intrinsic properties are self-contradictory" etc).  Don't get me started on disputes over Biblical inerrancy and contradictions, which miss the deeper issues altogether. Again, believers and doubters alike are guilty. 

-- There are strong arguments for an "afterlife"/ the continuation of personality and personal identity after the body dies and many of these arguments are not susceptible to explanations in terms of the mundane "usual suspects" (e.g. Braude 2003, Sudduth 2016 -- although the latter is more skeptical). These are based on either philosophical arguments about mind-brain relationship or, more interestingly, actual empirical observations that *seem* best interpreted as cases of postmortem survival. The best counter-explanation for the latter is itself "paranormal" one (e.g. again, see Sudduth 2016), albeit one that avoids an afterlife conclusion. There are too many other worthwhile references to list, but the list includes (in no particular order) Hodgson (1898), Kelly and Kelly (2007), Carter (2010, 2012), Blum (2006 for a review of the history of the SPR), Beischel (2015; yes, it's a good paper and most skeptics appear to not understand the methodology!), Rock (2014), etc. And here too most believers and doubters alike run their mouths without the slightest awareness of the literature. The purely-philosophical arguments can go back and forth forever, but the arguments based on certain empirical observations (which still require philosophical input) *must* be explained as *either* genuine afterlife glimpses or at least genuine psi-mediated experiences. 

-- On psi issues, see Cardena (2018), Radin (2006), Storm et al (2010), appendix of Kelly and Kelly (2007), etc. As statistician Jessica Utts has argued, using the standards applied to every other area of science, psi effects have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Alcock, Wiseman, Carroll, Krauss, French, Hyman, etc. are simply wrong. Demonstrably wrong.   

Of course, the experts themselves are also often blinded by biases, but the authors mentioned here are generally earnest truth-seekers, even if they end up disagreeing with each other. 

No, I don't expect EVERYONE to read all of the references I mentioned (which is just the tip of an iceberg), but it would be nice if more people made some serious effort to get to the bottom of these issues and thereby advance the status quo of dialogue. I am constantly stunned at the level of superficiality and shallowness of the conversations and arguments. 

These are hugely important issues. We can do better. You can do better. 

For someone on FB

——

Some of the confusion may be stemming from the word "how," which often carries mechanistic connotations...

So e.g. suppose that somebody asks me, "HOW can a person have debilitating hypersensitivity to multiple and unrelated chemicals without it being IgE-mediated?" I would reply by inviting them to read the work of Pall and others, whose work provides good evidence that excessive production of endogenous nitric oxide (NO) is involved in some cases. NO can keep itself elevated through several positive feedback loops (e.g. NO reacts with superoxide to make peroxynitrite which in turn can increase production of both its precursors!) and that NO can theoretically cause such extreme hypersensitivity given (a) its ability to simultaneously enhance NMDA activity while depleting ATP (it's known that cells containing NMDA receptors become hypersensitive to stimuli when deprived of ATP), (B) the ability of peroxynitrite to cause blood brain barrier permeability, (c) NO's ability to inhibit p450s, (d) etc (more mechanisms have been outlined, including insights on vallinoid receptors). I would also note that animal and human studies (including replicated genetic studies) show some involvement of NO in many alleged MCS cases.

Ok, long winded, but that's one kind of a "how" question. It involves detailing physical *mechanisms.*  So it might be confusing to ask "how" there could be nonphysical reality. Perhaps it would be clearer to ask something like the following:

*Why* should we conclude that any aspect of reality is nonphysical or that reality is ultimately grounded in a nonphysical Source? Are there any good reasons for thinking so?

On this latter question I would repeat my recommendation that you read and engage arguments for classical theism. If you make a case for (some version of) PSR and then combine it the classical arguments from "motion" (by which one usually means actualization of potential a la Feser, Kerr, or Hart) or from composites (eg Feser or Fradd), etc. *then,* as noted earlier, you will be taken back to a necessary Source of reality that is nonphysical. 

Or are you asking about nonphysical realities other than the God of classical theism? Are you asking about "souls?" Afterlife? Abstract objects? 

If PSR is true, and if all physical reality is contingent, then it's plausible that physical reality is grounded in and/or emanates from a logically-prior Source that isn't physical, and this would be the case even if the past is infinite. This still requires a lot of unpacking, and I certainly don't expect you to be persuaded by anything written so far, but is this at least helpful in moving the conversation forward? 

This is a long YouTube comment addressed to someone in particular.

=================

You're overly attached to this mistaken objection of "that's a blunder." There is no blunder here. If you disagree, I would encourage you to write a short essay with a brief logical analysis, maybe quote some philosophers who disagree with you and respond to them, and then submit your paper to a secular philosophy journal. 

The "blunder" appears *only* if we're talking about entirely contingent realities (since no contingent reality could explain itself), not with the concept of a necessary reality -- IF (some version of) PSR were true. By "contingent" I mean something whose non-existence is possible and by PSR I mean the idea that there's an explanation for everything that exists. 

PSR is very controversial and I am not here endorsing PSR, but instead trying to help you understand why the "blunder" isn't a blunder if our model includes PSR. Look at it this way:

1. If some version of PSR is true then the *totality* of reality has an explanation.

2. PSR is true.

3. So the totality of reality has an explanation.

4. If the totality has an explanation, this explanation cannot be contingent (i.e it can't be something whose non-existence is possible) because we would then need an additional explanation as to why this thing (which may have failed to exist) nevertheless exists.

5. So the existence of this explanation must be *necessary*/ its non-existence must be impossible given (3) and (4). 

6. If the totality of reality has an explanation, that explanation cannot be exterior since we would then be positing something external to the "totality" of reality, which is a contradiction.

7. From (6), the explanation for the totality of reality must be (in some sense) *within* the totality of reality.

8. Therefore, some aspect of the totality of reality (X) serves as the explanation for the totality of reality.

9. However else we describe X, it cannot depend on anything beyond itself because *that* would then be the explanation for the totality. (Infinite regress mentioned later)

10. So the explanation of the totality is an explanatory *ultimate* and stopping point. There is no further existential explanatory source beyond X. 

11. From (2), (9), and (10), the explanation for this stopping point/X must reside in itself, i.e. X is self-explanatory exists by a necessity of its own nature, or i.e. its non-existence is metaphysically impossible. 

12. Some aspect of reality is self-explanatory.

13. If X is necessary and self-explanatory, then X exists because of X (which is *not* the same claim as "X caused X").

14. X is necessary and self-explanatory.

15. Therefore X because of X.

I wrote this in a hurry and if I had more time and inclination then I'd probably polish and sharpen it. Rasmussen, Feser, Koons, Hart, etc. would have made this clearer and more succinct. Either way, PSR (if true) and the nature of contingent reality will ultimately take you back to an explanatory ultimate that is non-contingent and exists by a necessity of its own nature-- self-explanatory.

If you want to insist that this is a blunder, then IMO it seems you are committed to a denial of any and all forms of PSR. In which case, I'd simply recommend Feser's chapter on PSR in his 2017 book "Five Proofs" under the title "The Rationalist Proof."

To be fair, one can grant some form of PSR and concede a necessary/self-explanatory stopping point for the sake of argument and then simply deny that this necessary reality has the properties normally ascribed to the God of classical theism (as Dawkins, Oppy, etc. have argued). That's a separate discussion.

Also, if someone were inclined to insist upon an infinite regress they still wouldn't avoid the issue of "X because of X" since we can apply PSR to the infinite regress itself. So even if there's an infinite regress that just is the explanatory ultimate without any explanation outside of the regress, then we would still be saying "X because of X" -- in this case, infinite regress because of infinite regress. For the record, I don't think infinite regresses of any sort would satisfy PSR, but that's another topic for another day and isn't relevant to the overall point being made here.

NOTE: Again, at this point I am not trying to argue for classical theism. I'm merely attempting to explain a scenario in which "X because of X" isn't a blunder.

“Build that wall”

(Inspired by delicious brownies)

 Joe Biden be like, “Yah, kids and the and the, and the thing the other day. Oh you know. And there was a night time event after it. I have hairy legs.” 

But Donald Trump be like: “My farts. Let me tell you. Nobody has classier farts than me. People tell me all the time. All the time. They say, ‘hey Donald!! Great stuff. Great stuff.’ Smells terrific, let me tell you. Thumbs up 👍. Sometimes I thumb Melania. I would double thumb my Evankuh if she weren’t my daughter. Build, my, wall, guns, cash— see that? I memorized those five words. 18 hours ago. Still got it. Still got it. The doctors were so thrilled by me. And, frankly, jealous. They tell me all the time. They ask me to give them a physical. I tell them, ‘who do you think you are? My daughter?’ God bless America.”