Blackmore starts off by saying that the parapsych route away from naturalism is closed off because her own experiments failed to produce evidence. But she's demonstrably wrong here. Berger has published a fairly strong critique of her work, which failed to discuss the plethora of strong cases (references available upon request) and contains  methodological faults. See http://archived.parapsych.org/psiexplorer/blackmore_critique.htm

Blackmore has replied to Berger in an equally forceful paper. Her rejoinder contains some admittedly valid and worthy counterpoints, but she nonetheless admits the following: "in spite of Berger's numerous errors, I agree that one cannot draw conclusions about the reality of psi based on these [Blackmore's] experiments. The results are relevant to the problem of replicability in para- psychology, but as far as the reality of psi is concerned I draw only one conclusion: I don't know. [...] [Berger] has made numerous errors and has seriously misrepresented my work. Nevertheless, I am glad to be able to agree with his final conclusion—'that drawing any conclusions, positive or negative, about the reality of psi that are based on the Blackmore psi experiments must be considered unwarranted'" (See "A Critical Response to Rick Berger" at http://www.criticandokardec.com.br/blackmore.pdf)

Again, Blackmore is wrong about the issue of replicability in several areas (albeit not all, so she's not entirely wrong), but I would have to elaborate in a follow up comment to avoid making this one too long.

To avoid confusion, I don't think psi effects prove anything supernatural. Perhaps naturalism is compatible with psi effects, though we may end up having to expand our notion of "nature" and "physical" (which isn't meant to be a way of sneaking in anything beyond the physical). My point is, instead, that Blackmore is sadly being a bit dishonest here. I really like her, so it pains me to say this.

The following was originally meant to be a comment for the YouTube comment section , so PLEASE expect this to be pitiful when judged by academic standards! For academic standards, contact me.

==========================================

To whom it may concern, RE Braude vs Sudduth on survival vs living-agent psi:

UMBC Philosopher Stephen Braude's 2003 book "Immortal Remains" is an in depth philosophical analysis of the empirical arguments for postmortem survival in the form of trance mediumship, NDE/OBEs, alleged reincarnation, and heart/lung transplant cases. Much of the work discussed or alluded to was published by the British Society for Psychical Research (SPR) and its American branch (ASPR), both of which are still around today and whose members include skeptics and "believers" alike (e.g. arch-skeptic Richard Wiseman was a council member for the SPR for ten years...). Braude shows that, in the best cases (e.g. Kakie sittings and GP sittings among countless others) the mundane "usual suspects" of fraud, malobservation, etc. are unable to even "get a foot in the door." He then explores what he calls "exotic but non-paranormal" explanations in terms of latent savant-like talents that emerge (either only or mostly) in certain dissociative states. Here again Braude shows that the "best cases" can't be explained this way due to the fact (or very high likelihood) of anomalous information acquisition not mediated by the five senses. This leaves only two options:

Either:

A: Genuine instances of survival (with the surviving personality somehow interacting with the empirical world)

or

B: Psychic functioning among living persons that mimics or simulates the appearance of postmortem survival. LAP hypothesis or "super-psi" hypothesis, although the latter term is often taken to be pejorative and misleading. LAP arguments often overlap with arguments over Schizoaffective spectrum and/or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), especially in cases of trance mediumship. It can be argued that, in cases where "normal" non-survival explanations fail, it may still be the case that these personalities are the product of dissociative states that allow the use of latent psychic functioning, which together look an awful lot like someone is really getting intimate information from a departed loved on.

(NO, I am not saying that DID and schizophrenia are the same. Many people mistake the two. They're different conditions)

B comes in a variety of forms, and critics allege that it would require a degree of psi prowess that hasn't been demonstrated in non-survival contexts. Braude questions this claim but also shows that it wouldn't matter that much anyway. Even IF psychic functioning is less refined in all non-survival contexts, one can still argue that LAP is more plausible than actual survival. 

In studying the merits of LAP Braude did extensive research into DID and dissociation, resulting in both his book "First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind" (https://tinyurl.com/yyrsrzap) and his receiving the Distinguished Achievement Award from the International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation (you can find his name on their official web site; I'm too lazy to fetch it)

That aside, Braude ultimately ends up concluding that the scales are slightly tipped in favor of survival over LAP, but "it's not a slam-dunk."

ENTER SUDDUTH

Philosophy professor Michael Sudduth argues that survivalists implicitly presuppose certain "auxiliary assumptions" that they haven't shown to be plausible. As a result, among other things, Sudduth thinks that survivalists have not been able to rule out LAP as a competing explanation for the empirical observations. Sudduth himself specifically details (among others) the "34 veridical claims" in the kakie sittings and the impressive hits in the GP sittings. See his book "A Philosophical Critique of Empirical Arguments for Postmortem Survival." (https://tinyurl.com/y46bddqv)

To be sure, there are alleged survival cases that Sudduth wouldn't even want to invoke LAP for, and my above summary of his "Philosophical Critique" is pitiful given the rich and sophisticated content, but I'm not aware of any place where Sudduth has denied the existence of ESP/psi effects. On the contrary, in several places he seems to imply their existence. 

For example, in a blog entry in which he replies to survivalist Christ Carter, Sudduth writes,

[QUOTE] 

Most empirical survivalists, and Carter is no exception here, think it’s fairly clear that ordinary-psi cannot account for salient strands of evidence.  Hence, Carter speaks of “ESP of the required power and range” (emphasis mine). So survivalists tend to devote most of their energy to refuting the super-psi version of the LAP hypothesis. 

Now I’ve argued elsewhere (Sudduth 2013a, 2013b) that survivalists have not adequately grounded the ostensible requirement that psi be of a greater magnitude, potency, or refinement than ordinary-psi in order to pose a problem for survival arguments.  In this I’m preceded by and INDEBTED TO THE HIGH CALIBER WORK OF PHILOSOPHER STEPHEN BRAUDE (2003).  Part of the problem is that survivalists operate with an implausibly narrow conception of how living-agent psi would challenge empirical arguments for survival, and this is often further based on a weak grasp of the content of the LAP hypothesis.  I’ve tried to show how ORDINARY-PSI DOES INDEED pose a challenge to classical empirical survival arguments. This is particularly acute when survival arguments are formulated along Bayesian lines and propose a conclusion about the net plausibility of the survival hypothesis based on the extent to which the survival hypothesis leads us to expect the data, the extent to which the data are otherwise not to be expected, and the initial credibility of the survival hypothesis. 

[END QUOTE, caps added for emphasis. see  http://michaelsudduth.com/chris-carters-challenge-survival-vs-super-psi/]

Here Sudduth not only praises Braude but also implicitly accepts psi, at least for the sake of argument.

In a 2019 interview with  Carlos Alvarado, Sudduth says, "I also benefited from a decade of conversations with parapsychologists and fellow philosophers who have worked and published on this topic. I’ve also joined parapsychologists on some field investigations over the years (with Loyd Auerbach, for example), and I’ve critically examined mediums firsthand. I'VE ALSO PERSONALLY EXPERIENCED a broad range of ostensibly paranormal phenomena." (caps added). See https://tinyurl.com/y3vhwuf8

Finally, see Sudduth's 2009 paper "Super-psi and the Survivalist Interpretation of Mediumship" at michaelsudduth.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/jse_23_2_sudduth.pdf . From the abstract:

[QUOTE] According to the survivalist interpretation of mediumship, the existence of discarnate persons provides the best explanation for the data associated with physical and mental mediumship.  Others—advocates of what is often called the “super-psi hypothesis”—maintain that the data of mediumship may be at least equally explained in terms of living agent psi (ESP and psychokinesis).  Many defenders of the survivalist interpretation of mediumship attempt to deflate the alleged explanatory virtues of the super-psi hypothesis by arguing that the hypothesis is unfalsifiable and lacks independent evidential support.  My central contention in this paper is that these frequently encountered survivalist criticisms of the super-psi hypothesis are ultimately self-defeating to the case for survival from mediumship.  To show this I first argue in some detail that the survivalist interpretation of mediumship is committed to a kind or degree of psi that is indistinguishable from what is required by the super-psi hypothesis.  From this vantage point it can be shown that any attempt to impugn the explanatory virtues of the super-psi hypothesis on account of the kind or degree of psi it requires undercuts the argument for survival itself. [END OF QUOTATION] 

 Internet atheists: Atheists don't say "there IS no god;" we simply lack belief, but we're not making any affirmative/positive claims, so we don't have a burden. In contrast you make a positive claim ("theism is true") requiring evidence and/or (depending on your definition of "evidence") (a) syllogism(s) which conclude(s) "therefore (some form of) theism is true."

Also internet atheists: In the same way that you lack belief in fairies, or in unicorns, or in Zeus.

Everyone else: ..... 

Internet atheists: ”what? Dawkinskraussdennetthitchensharris.”

Everyone else: Well, since we know (or at the very least have very good reasons for saying) that there are NO unicorns or fairies etc, then by drawing an an analogy between classical theism and fairies you are implicitly claiming that we likewise know (or have very good reasons for saying) that classical theism is false. That's more than merely "lacking belief;" that's a positive claim! Atheist and agnostic philosophers of religion who are knowledgeable of this field are more precise and less confusing in their terminology. 

Internet Atheists: DAWKINS DAWKINS DAWKINS!!! 😡

This is going to sound smug. Don't care. 

Every idea we encounter is filtered through a set of theoretical lenses that are crafted through personal experiences, upbringing, culture, and formal education. It's a frustrating trend for people to conflate their lenses with "THE" truth, without realizing that they're applying more scrutiny to new or counter ideas -- turning that skeptical dial up more to these "different" ideas-- than they are to their own model(s) of reality. This is also oddly true for people formally-educated in one area addressing ideas in a separate area. We often don't see or grasp how ignorant we are and how worthwhile the counter-arguments are. 

This is painfully obvious in philosophy of religion and certain ("controversial") areas of scientific inquiry:

-- There are worthwhile philosophical arguments for (at least classical) theism (by e.g. Hart, Feser, Kerr, Fradd, Rasmussen, Koons, Pruss, Loke, and, yes, even WL Craig... etc.), and of course there are worthwhile critiques and rejoinders (Oppy, Malpass, Fodor, Mackie, Rowe, Grayling, Morriston, etc), but most people don't know the literature. At all. That's fine, actually; no problem. The problem comes in when people smugly, obnoxiously, and authoritatively PRONOUNCE on issues they don't know anything about. So many people (believers and doubters alike) have no clue about this literature, and so they routinely raise ridiculous arguments and objections. Many believers will smugly argue for "God" with pseudo syllogisms that would make knowledgeable 7th graders blush. But the same is true of the anti-theistic arguments made by so many atheists (e.g. "who made God?" or "special pleading exemption for requiring a cause of his own" or "God's alleged intrinsic properties are self-contradictory" etc).  Don't get me started on disputes over Biblical inerrancy and contradictions, which miss the deeper issues altogether. Again, believers and doubters alike are guilty. 

-- There are strong arguments for an "afterlife"/ the continuation of personality and personal identity after the body dies and many of these arguments are not susceptible to explanations in terms of the mundane "usual suspects" (e.g. Braude 2003, Sudduth 2016 -- although the latter is more skeptical). These are based on either philosophical arguments about mind-brain relationship or, more interestingly, actual empirical observations that *seem* best interpreted as cases of postmortem survival. The best counter-explanation for the latter is itself "paranormal" one (e.g. again, see Sudduth 2016), albeit one that avoids an afterlife conclusion. There are too many other worthwhile references to list, but the list includes (in no particular order) Hodgson (1898), Kelly and Kelly (2007), Carter (2010, 2012), Blum (2006 for a review of the history of the SPR), Beischel (2015; yes, it's a good paper and most skeptics appear to not understand the methodology!), Rock (2014), etc. And here too most believers and doubters alike run their mouths without the slightest awareness of the literature. The purely-philosophical arguments can go back and forth forever, but the arguments based on certain empirical observations (which still require philosophical input) *must* be explained as *either* genuine afterlife glimpses or at least genuine psi-mediated experiences. 

-- On psi issues, see Cardena (2018), Radin (2006), Storm et al (2010), appendix of Kelly and Kelly (2007), etc. As statistician Jessica Utts has argued, using the standards applied to every other area of science, psi effects have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Alcock, Wiseman, Carroll, Krauss, French, Hyman, etc. are simply wrong. Demonstrably wrong.   

Of course, the experts themselves are also often blinded by biases, but the authors mentioned here are generally earnest truth-seekers, even if they end up disagreeing with each other. 

No, I don't expect EVERYONE to read all of the references I mentioned (which is just the tip of an iceberg), but it would be nice if more people made some serious effort to get to the bottom of these issues and thereby advance the status quo of dialogue. I am constantly stunned at the level of superficiality and shallowness of the conversations and arguments. 

These are hugely important issues. We can do better. You can do better. 

For someone on FB

——

Some of the confusion may be stemming from the word "how," which often carries mechanistic connotations...

So e.g. suppose that somebody asks me, "HOW can a person have debilitating hypersensitivity to multiple and unrelated chemicals without it being IgE-mediated?" I would reply by inviting them to read the work of Pall and others, whose work provides good evidence that excessive production of endogenous nitric oxide (NO) is involved in some cases. NO can keep itself elevated through several positive feedback loops (e.g. NO reacts with superoxide to make peroxynitrite which in turn can increase production of both its precursors!) and that NO can theoretically cause such extreme hypersensitivity given (a) its ability to simultaneously enhance NMDA activity while depleting ATP (it's known that cells containing NMDA receptors become hypersensitive to stimuli when deprived of ATP), (B) the ability of peroxynitrite to cause blood brain barrier permeability, (c) NO's ability to inhibit p450s, (d) etc (more mechanisms have been outlined, including insights on vallinoid receptors). I would also note that animal and human studies (including replicated genetic studies) show some involvement of NO in many alleged MCS cases.

Ok, long winded, but that's one kind of a "how" question. It involves detailing physical *mechanisms.*  So it might be confusing to ask "how" there could be nonphysical reality. Perhaps it would be clearer to ask something like the following:

*Why* should we conclude that any aspect of reality is nonphysical or that reality is ultimately grounded in a nonphysical Source? Are there any good reasons for thinking so?

On this latter question I would repeat my recommendation that you read and engage arguments for classical theism. If you make a case for (some version of) PSR and then combine it the classical arguments from "motion" (by which one usually means actualization of potential a la Feser, Kerr, or Hart) or from composites (eg Feser or Fradd), etc. *then,* as noted earlier, you will be taken back to a necessary Source of reality that is nonphysical. 

Or are you asking about nonphysical realities other than the God of classical theism? Are you asking about "souls?" Afterlife? Abstract objects? 

If PSR is true, and if all physical reality is contingent, then it's plausible that physical reality is grounded in and/or emanates from a logically-prior Source that isn't physical, and this would be the case even if the past is infinite. This still requires a lot of unpacking, and I certainly don't expect you to be persuaded by anything written so far, but is this at least helpful in moving the conversation forward? 

This is a long YouTube comment addressed to someone in particular.

=================

You're overly attached to this mistaken objection of "that's a blunder." There is no blunder here. If you disagree, I would encourage you to write a short essay with a brief logical analysis, maybe quote some philosophers who disagree with you and respond to them, and then submit your paper to a secular philosophy journal. 

The "blunder" appears *only* if we're talking about entirely contingent realities (since no contingent reality could explain itself), not with the concept of a necessary reality -- IF (some version of) PSR were true. By "contingent" I mean something whose non-existence is possible and by PSR I mean the idea that there's an explanation for everything that exists. 

PSR is very controversial and I am not here endorsing PSR, but instead trying to help you understand why the "blunder" isn't a blunder if our model includes PSR. Look at it this way:

1. If some version of PSR is true then the *totality* of reality has an explanation.

2. PSR is true.

3. So the totality of reality has an explanation.

4. If the totality has an explanation, this explanation cannot be contingent (i.e it can't be something whose non-existence is possible) because we would then need an additional explanation as to why this thing (which may have failed to exist) nevertheless exists.

5. So the existence of this explanation must be *necessary*/ its non-existence must be impossible given (3) and (4). 

6. If the totality of reality has an explanation, that explanation cannot be exterior since we would then be positing something external to the "totality" of reality, which is a contradiction.

7. From (6), the explanation for the totality of reality must be (in some sense) *within* the totality of reality.

8. Therefore, some aspect of the totality of reality (X) serves as the explanation for the totality of reality.

9. However else we describe X, it cannot depend on anything beyond itself because *that* would then be the explanation for the totality. (Infinite regress mentioned later)

10. So the explanation of the totality is an explanatory *ultimate* and stopping point. There is no further existential explanatory source beyond X. 

11. From (2), (9), and (10), the explanation for this stopping point/X must reside in itself, i.e. X is self-explanatory exists by a necessity of its own nature, or i.e. its non-existence is metaphysically impossible. 

12. Some aspect of reality is self-explanatory.

13. If X is necessary and self-explanatory, then X exists because of X (which is *not* the same claim as "X caused X").

14. X is necessary and self-explanatory.

15. Therefore X because of X.

I wrote this in a hurry and if I had more time and inclination then I'd probably polish and sharpen it. Rasmussen, Feser, Koons, Hart, etc. would have made this clearer and more succinct. Either way, PSR (if true) and the nature of contingent reality will ultimately take you back to an explanatory ultimate that is non-contingent and exists by a necessity of its own nature-- self-explanatory.

If you want to insist that this is a blunder, then IMO it seems you are committed to a denial of any and all forms of PSR. In which case, I'd simply recommend Feser's chapter on PSR in his 2017 book "Five Proofs" under the title "The Rationalist Proof."

To be fair, one can grant some form of PSR and concede a necessary/self-explanatory stopping point for the sake of argument and then simply deny that this necessary reality has the properties normally ascribed to the God of classical theism (as Dawkins, Oppy, etc. have argued). That's a separate discussion.

Also, if someone were inclined to insist upon an infinite regress they still wouldn't avoid the issue of "X because of X" since we can apply PSR to the infinite regress itself. So even if there's an infinite regress that just is the explanatory ultimate without any explanation outside of the regress, then we would still be saying "X because of X" -- in this case, infinite regress because of infinite regress. For the record, I don't think infinite regresses of any sort would satisfy PSR, but that's another topic for another day and isn't relevant to the overall point being made here.

NOTE: Again, at this point I am not trying to argue for classical theism. I'm merely attempting to explain a scenario in which "X because of X" isn't a blunder.

“Build that wall”

(Inspired by delicious brownies)

 Joe Biden be like, “Yah, kids and the and the, and the thing the other day. Oh you know. And there was a night time event after it. I have hairy legs.” 

But Donald Trump be like: “My farts. Let me tell you. Nobody has classier farts than me. People tell me all the time. All the time. They say, ‘hey Donald!! Great stuff. Great stuff.’ Smells terrific, let me tell you. Thumbs up 👍. Sometimes I thumb Melania. I would double thumb my Evankuh if she weren’t my daughter. Build, my, wall, guns, cash— see that? I memorized those five words. 18 hours ago. Still got it. Still got it. The doctors were so thrilled by me. And, frankly, jealous. They tell me all the time. They ask me to give them a physical. I tell them, ‘who do you think you are? My daughter?’ God bless America.”

Citations

 NDEs are among the weakest evidence for an afterlife, but some academics have argued that the "paranormal" interpretation of (at least some) NDEs is currently the best one — in the sense of exceeding the plausibility of the mundane stereotypical "nothing to see here" physicalist interpretations— even if endogenous psychedelics are heavily involved in mediating the experience. The pro-and-con literature is fascinating. Here are a few examples on both sides. Meow.

ON UNEXPECTED SURGES/SPIKES IN BRAIN ACTIVITY ACCOUNTING FOR NDEs

a) Borjigin et al (2013) Surge of neurophysiological coherence and connectivity in the dying brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol 110, issue 35, pp 14432–14437. (b) Chawla, L. Seneff, MG (2013) End-of-life electrical surges. Proc Natl Acad Sci, 110(44), p 4123. (c) Borjigin et al. (2013) Reply to Chawla and Seneff: Near-death electrical brain activity in humans and animals requires additional studies. Proc Natl Acad Sci 110(44), p 4124. (d) Borjigin et al (2013) Reply to Greyson et al.: Experimental evidence lays a foundation for a rational understanding of near-death experiences. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013 Nov 19;110(47), p 4406. In this last reference, Borjigin et al give Greyson et al a public spanking of their intellectual ass. (e) Chawla et al (2017). Characterization of end-of-life electroencephalographic surges in critically ill patients. Death Studies, vol 41, issue 6, pp 385-392.

On Operation Standstill (a) Woerlee (2011) Could Pam Reynolds Hear? A New Investigation into the Possibility of Hearing During this Famous Near-Death Experience, Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 30, issue 1, pp 3-25. (b) Hameroff (2011) Response to "Could Pam Reynolds Hear?" Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 30, issue 1, pp 26-28. (c) Carter (2011). Response to "Could Pam Reynolds Hear?" Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 30, issue 1, pp 29-53 (this guy blabbers a lot). (d) Woerlee (2011). Rejoinder to Response to "Could Pam Reynolds Hear?" Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 30, issue 1, pp 54-61. (e) Dr. Jeffrey Long, a fierce proponent of the survivalist interpretation, told me, “I’ve never felt Pam’s NDE was anywhere near as evidential as it has been represented, as her OBE observations correspond to the time that they were trying to start the vascular access lines, and there is no chance that was at the time her body was in hypothermic arrest. Having said that, it takes time for auditory filtering to happen, and 100 decibel clicks are on the extreme end of what you could ignore under any circumstances. I find it almost inconceivable that Pam did not hear the clicks, but did hear conversation, unless she was OBE. I have to agree with Gerald [Woerlee] that her ability to hear that song may be anesthetic awareness. ” (Personal email communication, February 28, 2011) On the Missing Dentures case, see Smit, RH; Rivas, T. (2010) Rejoinder to “Response to ‘Corroboration of the Dentures Anecdote Involving Veridical Perception in a Near-Death Experience’” Journal of Near Death Studies vol 28, issue 4, p 193-205. General overviews (pro and con): Sudduth (2016) A Philosophical Critique of Empirical Arguments for Postmortem Survival,  Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion (chapter 3) Carter (2010) Science and the Near Death Experience: How Consciousness Survives Death, published by Inner Traditions. This is part 2 of Carter’s trilogy on psi and science. This book covers most (albeit not all) of the non-paranormal naturalistic models and explains their shortcomings. It also covers some of the proposed veridical cases and argues that the skeptical literature has unfairly assessed (at least some of) these cases. Carter is a frequent contributor to the Journal of Near Death Studies. Kelly and Kelly et al. (2007) Irreducible Mind: Towards a Psychology for the 21st Century, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (chapter 6). Braude (2003) Immortal Remains: The Evidence for Life After Death, Rowman and Littlefield Publisherd, Inc. (chapter 8) (ETC ETC ETC) Pro and con articles: (a) Augustine (2007). Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs? Journal of Near Death Studies, Vol 25, issue 4, pp 203-236. Available in its entirety for free at https://tinyurl.com/yawy77q8 Abstract: “While most near-death researchers have disregarded reports of near-death experiences (NDEs) with hallucinatory features, many have sought cases of veridical paranormal perception during NDEs. But despite more than a quarter century of near-death studies, no compelling evidence that NDErs can obtain information from remote locations during their NDEs has been forthcoming. This paper, Part I of a critique of survivalist interpretations of NDEs, reviews the quality of the evidence for veridical observations during NDEs, and finds the case for veridical paranormal perception during NDEs wanting.” (b) Greyson (2007). Comments on “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?” Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 25, issue 4, pp 237-244. (c) Clark (2007). The Other Shoe Drops: Commentary on “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?” Ibid (too lazy to write the same Journal vol an d issue), pp 245-250. (d) Tart (2007) Commentary on “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?” Ibid, pp 251-256. (e) Sabom (2007) Commentary on “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?” Ibid 257-260. (f) Augustine (2007) “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?" Defended. Ibid, pp 261-283. Abstract: “Four preceding commentaries present a variety of criticisms of ‘Does Paranormal Perception Occur in Near-Death Experiences?’: that most near-death researchers do not interpret near-death experiences (NDEs) as evidence for life after death; that near-death researchers never appeal to NDE accounts incorporating predictable or uncorroborated details as evidence for veridical paranormal perception during NDEs; that reliable data contradict my critique of near-death veridicality studies; that it is unscientific to suggest a role for embellishment in NDE reports; that the patient in the Maria's shoe case reported veridical details that she could not have learned about through conventional means; and that my critique of the Pam Reynolds case amounts to an ‘a priori dismissal’ of features suggesting veridical paranormal perception or consciousness in the absence of brain activity. I respond to each of these and other criticisms in kind.” etc etc etc etc etc etc

I'm perplexed as to why this video has so many likes. Tim Maudlin is indeed an excellent and skilled philosopher, and his arguments and lectures usually merit serious consideration, but on *this* issue he really dropped the ball.

He starts off by saying that this question of whether absolute non-being is possible-- of why there is existence rather than non-existence-- lacks a satisfactory answer. There just *isn't* a satisfactory answer to give or receive, says Maudlin.

Then, after some prompting from Kuhn, Maudlin tells us that mathematical and moral values could not be different no matter how different the physical world were. This leads Kuhn to suggest that these are therefore "necessary" truths, and Maudlin seems to agree that they are.

This then leads Kuhn to suggest that Maudlin is, on his own view, therefore committed to a category of "necessary existence." Here Maudlin seems to get confused as to what Kuhn means. But this isn't a confusing question; the question is whether there is any actual aspect of reality that has to exist and could fail to exist, and relatedly, whether there are truths that cannot be fail to obtain. If Maudlin isn't confident one way or another, he could have just said that. There is a fact of the matter, even if we disagree on it.

If Maudlin says "no" -- if he thinks that there isn't an aspect of reality that is non-contingent/necessary -- then he would be insinuating (if not outright asserting) that the contingent physical realm just IS the totality of reality.

In that case, the question becomes whether the physical realm *has* to exist-- whether the non-existence of physical reality is possible. Here Maudlin seems confused by what we mean by "possible," but, as before, this really shouldn't be confusing. Another phrasing would be the following: Could *all* physical reality *fail* to exist? This question is coherent/intelligible, even if Maudlin isn't confident in any answer.

If Maudlin wants to say that, no, physical reality could not fail to exist, then he'd be claiming that the answer to the original question -- why is there anything at all -- is to be found within the nature of physical reality itself; i.e. that physical reality, or at least some aspect of physical reality, exists by a necessity of its own nature. This answer is intelligible, even if false. If Maudlin goes this route then he appears to be "satisfied" with it.

This is arguably implausible though. Leaving aside questions concerning the finitude of the past (which WLC dwells on), one could still argue like Leibniz or Pruss or Feser that physical reality is contingent even if its past is beginningless. See Pruss's chapter in the 2009 Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology and also chapter 2 of Ed Feser's 2017 book "Five Proofs." Perhaps they're mistaken though. I won't spell it all out here.

  Going back to Maudlin's idea that moral and mathematical values are somehow "not physical" and "couldn't be different" even if physics were different, this notion seems to imply that indeed some aspect of reality *is* non-physical and non-contingent, otherwise Maudlin would just be wrong when he says that these truths wouldn't change regardless of how much physical reality were changed. Kuhn sees this, although his way of expressing it may have confused Maudlin. He hints at it by asking Maudlin whether the laws of physics *have* to exist. He wants to know whether moral and mathematical truths would "exist" in the *absence* of all physical reality, including the laws of physics. If there were NO physical reality at all -- if there were NO laws of physics, no subatomic particles at all (no quarks, no photons, etc), no strings at all, no fields at all, etc. -- would mathematical or moral truths still exist? Would *anything* still exist?

Maudlin may not be confident in any answer, but the question is intelligible and there is a fact of the matter. And if he wants to argue that *none* of the answers are viable then he needs to engage Pruss and Feser on the theistic side and perhaps someone like Vilenkin on the atheistic side.

Polytheism vs classical theism (25% done)

Following  Aquinas’s example, visualize a hand pushing a stick, and that stick in turn is pushing a big rock, which In turn is pushing a medium sized rock, which is pushing a small rock. The medium sized rock is borrowing or deriving its “power” to push from the bigger rock, which is borrowing its power to push from the stick, which is borrowing from the hand. It’s all occurring at once. Scotus calls this an "essentially ordered series," Aquinas calls it a "per se series," and Feser calls it a hierarchical regress. 

A hierarchical regress is different from a linear/temporal regress. A temporal series is an example of what Scotus calls "an accidentally ordered series" and Aquinas calls a "per accidens series," which is a series wherein later members don't depend on earlier members. In contrast, a hierarchical regress occurs right here and right now, and is one in which the members depend on a logically-prior member (explained more below). Visualize a similar hierarchical regress occurring within the totality/fabric of reality itself— one level of reality depending on a logically/explanatorily prior level, which depends on yet a prior level, etc. all at once.

 Again, this isn’t necessarily about contemporary states depending on past states; that’s not what “prior” means in a hierarchical regress. Imagine that the hand in the aforementioned example has been pushing the stick since eternity past, with the series of past events/movements having no beginning in time. In that case, we could still say that the movement of the hand is logically or explanatorily prior to the movement of the stick. Or, following Kant, imagine that a heavy ball has been resting on a cushion for eternity-- or opposite extreme, imagine the ball resting on the cushion timelessly -- in either case we could still maintain that the weight and roundness of the ball are logically/explanatorily prior to the indentation in the cushion. Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Edward Feser (eg 2008, 2017 among others), David Bentley Hart (2014), Rasmussen (2018, 2019 among others), etc. (Koons, Pruss, Kerr, etc) would argue that even an eternal universe with no beginning would still be contingent and dependent in similar ways and would still involve explanatory hierarchical regresses at any and every moment. 

Classical theism says that the hierarchical regress--or the series of explanations that derive or borrow their explanatory capacity from a logically-prior explanation-- must have a bottom level, which is the First Member or First Cause or First Explanation (regardless of whether time has a beginning). It would be the equivalent of the hand in that example of the hand pushing the stick etc. but in this case at the deepest level of reality. 

(The example of the hand pushing the stick can cause confusion if one imagines the hand approaching the stick and then picking it up, which would involve temporal changes in time. Instead, conceive of something akin to gears all moving at once. Or, in Feser's example, imagine a book resting on a coffee table which is in the floor etc wherein the explanation and the effect being explained occur together simultaneously.)

 Classical theism calls that first member of the hierarchical series of reality "God." Traditionally, classical theists argue that the First Member of the hierarchical regress of reality must be indivisible (just One), without parts (so can’t be material), fully actual without any potentiality requiring actualization a la Feser or Aristotle (which also rules out more than one since differentiation requires different members to have potentialities that the others lack), and must possess—or just be—intellect, will, etc. There are sophisticated arguments for these attributes (with rejoinders...) by the aforementioned authors with serious rigor, but most atheists (and believers alike) are simply ignorant of the literature. I won't detail their arguments in this post but strongly encourage reading their academic work. Again, an infinite past would be irrelevant. Imagine an infinite series of mirrors each reflecting the image of a face. Each mirror is deriving its image from a explanatorily-prior mirror, but an infinite number of mirrors still could not account for the image of the face, which must exist outside of the series. 

POLYTHEISM AND GOD OF THE GAPS

In contrast to classical theism, the gods of polytheism would be more like the stick, or the large/medium sized rocks, or the mirrors; they (the gods of polytheism) occur later in the explanatory series. Arguments for/against classical theism are mostly different from arguments for/against the gods of polytheism. So e.g. the arguments for classical theism based on the principle of sufficient reason/PSR (I prefer "ubiquity of intelligibility"), the contingency of physical reality, the reality of the actualization of potential in Aquinas and Feser, mathematical realism and the problem of universals, etc. would not be arguments for polytheism. And, similarly, arguments *against* polytheism based on science (eg we no longer invoke Zeus to explain lightning) are *not* arguments against classical theism. Relatedly, debunking "god of the gaps" arguments (I.e. debunking arguments that use “God” to plug up holes in our current scientific understanding) is not the same as debunking classical theism, because the latter is a philosophical/metaphysical concept about what (if anything) grounds the very possibility of the existence of the domain studied by science. Worthy non-believing/Atheistic philosophers include Graham Oppy, Jl Mackie, Alex Malpass, William Rowe, and others. Worthy believing philosophers were mentioned earlier. Below is a list of publications from both sides of the debate that ought to be read by anyone interested in natural theology.

CosmicSkeptic vs kalam cosmological argument

Alex O'Connor is a brilliant young man known on YoutTube as CosmicSkeptic. His channel is devoted to worthwhile intellectual discussions of various philosophical topics, but most notably natural theology and the ethics of meat-eating.

In 2017 Alex posted a critique of William Lane Craig's kalam cosmological argument (which Craig defends here and here among other places). Unfortunately, as Alex now realizes, his initial critique made several huge mistakes which he discusses in a recent video in which he critiques himself! While I appreciate his honesty and intelligence (as well as his kindness), and while his "debunking" of his own video is very good overall, I found a few issues that I wanted to address here.

First, around the 14:40 mark Alex mostly accurately summarizes the key argument for the personhood of the cause, but he’s still using the wrong terminology; Alex asks how a finite universe can come from an infinite cause and wonders, if the infinite cause is sufficient, then why isn’t the effect likewise infinite.

But when applied to the universe, “finite” and “infinite” are mathematical concepts, but “infinite” is NOT mathematical when applied to the cause, so there’s some unintentional equivocating going on here. WLC puts it like this: if the cause of the universe is timeless and permanent, then, if it’s also sufficient, why isn’t the effect likewise timeless/permanent? It’s all about a temporal origin from a timeless and sufficient cause. WLC asks us to imagine an beginning-less past wherein the temperature has always been below freezing. In this case, it’s silly to think that water would begin to freeze. Any water that was around would have been frozen from eternity past. WLC, following earlier Islamic and Christian philosophers, argues that the only way out of this dilemma is to suggest that the timeless cause in itself isn’t sufficient; its free decision to create is sufficient. Similarly, WLC, asks us to imagine (for sake of clarity and not literalness) a man sitting down timelessly and willing to stand up. The choice to stand makes the beginning of time.

Alex nevertheless manages to communicate the basic gist of the arguments, but his use of “infinite” here is a bit sloppy because he’s applying it to both the universe (where it’s mathematical) and the cause of the universe (where’s it’s qualitative rather than quantitative). 

(These points are discussed in references below, including the cited 2015 lecture and the Blackwell Companion)

Second, although Alex's original video claims that Aquinas argues for a beginning of the universe, and although the new video is supposed to critique the original, Alex still hasn’t explicitly acknowledged that Aquinas did not argue for a beginning of any universe. Thomistic scholars like Edward Feser have repeatedly clarified this point (e.g. here), to no avail. Alex does say that he misstated Aquinas but doesn't explain how. Aquinas believed in a temporal beginning on religious grounds, but he did not argue for it. Rather, he differentiates between a linear/temporal beginning of the universe (what he calls an accidentally ordered series) on the one hand, and then on the other hand a hierarchical (or essentially ordered) series that occurs here and now. Aquinas grants the possibility of a beginning-less accidentally ordered series for the sake of argument but then uses philosophical arguments against an infinite hierarchical series. Finally,  around 22:45 Alex claims that WLC does not regard the big bang as indicative of an absolute beginning but instead argues for such a beginning via philosophical arguments. This is partly mistaken. It’s true that WLC’s primary arguments for the finitude of the past are philosophical rather than scientific-- e.g. alleged absurdities ensuing from actual infinities and the impossibility of traversing infinity via successive addition, with the latter requiring WLC's defense of the A-theory of time (here, here, and here). But WLC also does argue that contemporary cosmology strongly points to an absolute beginning even if there’s a multiverse or cyclic model. See his chapter on the kalam (coauthored with a physicist) in the 2009 Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, or his 2014 debate with Carroll (where both men failed IMO-- see a review by Barnes, Wall, and Cram here), or his 2015 lecture at University of Birmingham in England, etc. PS. For the record, I am not convinced by WLC's arguments for the kalam.

Derren Brown vs psi

In this otherwise-exceptional Svengali video (at the 50:00 mark), the highly-skilled illusionist and brilliant skeptic Derren Brown explains why clairvoyance doesn't exist. "Of course it doesn't," he asserts. His reasoning/evidence? The participants from the audience (who never claimed to have had any clairvoyant experiences and did not previously demonstrate clairvoyance under experimental conditions) lo and behold failed to exhibit any clairvoyance on stage. Those people (on stage), under those circumstances, were unable to show any clairvoyance. That's it. That's Derren's argument against the possibility (or at least for the extreme unlikelihood) of clairvoyance.

Unfortunately, he is very ignorant of the psi literature. I strongly encourage Derren to read the following (among others that should be included at some point):

-- Cardena, E. (2018). The experimental evidence for parapsychological phenomena: A review. American Psychologist, volume 73, issue, 5, p 663-677. (official journal of the APA)

-- Storm et al (2010). A meta-analysis with nothing to hide: Reply to Hyman (2010), Psychological Bulletin, Volume 136, Issue 4, Jul 2010, pages 491-494. (This paper is on their prior work in the area of Ganzfeld and Ray Hyman's objections to it, which isn't what Derren was talking about, but I thought I'd share it since he also touches on ways to fake/simulate the appearance of telepathy)


-- Hodgson, R. (1892) A record of Observations of Certain Phenomena of Trance, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, volume 8, pages 1-167;


-- Hodgson, R. (1898) A Further Record of Observations of Certain Phenomena of Trance, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, volume 13, pages 284-582


-- Braude's 2003 book "Immortal Remains" (here) and Sudduth's 2016 book "A Philosophical Critique of Empirical Arguments for Postmortem Survival" (here). Both books are surprisingly skeptical, with Braude claiming that the survival hypothesis just barely beats the best alternative and Sudduth claiming that the best alternative is at least equally plausible. Sudduth is ultimately unconvinced by the evidence, but he and Braude both agree that the best alternative explanation of the relevant data is a (non-afterlife) paranormal interpretation (psi functioning among living people that mimics the appearance of an afterlife). In other words, the best and strongest cases that survivalists offer as evidence for an afterlife cannot be explained away with stereotypical mundane physicalist scenarios. Instead, if one wants to remain a skeptic of the afterlife, then one must conclude that these cases involve psychic functioning among living people. Braude and Sudduth's summaries of the cases are fair, accurate, and clear.
Here's the gist: The most Derren has demonstrated is that these particular individuals, under these particular circumstances, did not produce any psi effects. This is no more impressive than demonstrating that particular football players, under very particular circumstances, cannot score touchdowns. The latter merely states the obvious, whereas the former poses a serious challenge to the reality of psi effects only if we grant (ahead of time) certain assumptions about when and why psi effects occur, assumptions that are not consistent with reports from the general population and (since those reports don't prove anything) also with many the methodologically-sound studies that Derren has never refuted or even mentioned.

To further elaborate on the football example, Braude (2014) has offered a helpful conceptual analysis on whether we should categorize psi effects as universally-distributed capacities (like the capacity to breathe) or instead as abilities or skills. These aren't word games; how we conceptualize psi effects influences our expectations on when these effects should be observed and when their absence should be taken as proof of their non-existence. But not every man can produce an erection on the spot in front of hundreds or thousands of people (many porn stars can't even do that!), not every baseball player can score a homerun in every play, and (to connect abilities/skills with capacities:) not every swimmer can hold their breath for the same length of time in every race. None of this counts as evidence against the existence of the capacity/ability/skill in question. Again, the only way for Derren to reasonably interpret his failure to demonstrate clairvoyance as proof against the existence of clairvoyance is if we grant (ahead of time) certain assumptions about its natural history and about when/why it occurs, but these assumptions betray reports from the general public as well as sound data to the contrary. See Braude's 2014 book "Crimes of Reason" for in-depth discussions on these and related issues.

I genuinely respect and appreciate his work, but Derren really dropped the ball here. While one can find experts on both sides of the debate, it seems that Derren rarely (if ever) interviews actual experts who disagree with him (rather than buffoons like "medium" Joe Power, who is a fraud in my own opinion).