Citations

 NDEs are among the weakest evidence for an afterlife, but some academics have argued that the "paranormal" interpretation of (at least some) NDEs is currently the best one — in the sense of exceeding the plausibility of the mundane stereotypical "nothing to see here" physicalist interpretations— even if endogenous psychedelics are heavily involved in mediating the experience. The pro-and-con literature is fascinating. Here are a few examples on both sides. Meow.

ON UNEXPECTED SURGES/SPIKES IN BRAIN ACTIVITY ACCOUNTING FOR NDEs

a) Borjigin et al (2013) Surge of neurophysiological coherence and connectivity in the dying brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol 110, issue 35, pp 14432–14437. (b) Chawla, L. Seneff, MG (2013) End-of-life electrical surges. Proc Natl Acad Sci, 110(44), p 4123. (c) Borjigin et al. (2013) Reply to Chawla and Seneff: Near-death electrical brain activity in humans and animals requires additional studies. Proc Natl Acad Sci 110(44), p 4124. (d) Borjigin et al (2013) Reply to Greyson et al.: Experimental evidence lays a foundation for a rational understanding of near-death experiences. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013 Nov 19;110(47), p 4406. In this last reference, Borjigin et al give Greyson et al a public spanking of their intellectual ass. (e) Chawla et al (2017). Characterization of end-of-life electroencephalographic surges in critically ill patients. Death Studies, vol 41, issue 6, pp 385-392.

On Operation Standstill (a) Woerlee (2011) Could Pam Reynolds Hear? A New Investigation into the Possibility of Hearing During this Famous Near-Death Experience, Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 30, issue 1, pp 3-25. (b) Hameroff (2011) Response to "Could Pam Reynolds Hear?" Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 30, issue 1, pp 26-28. (c) Carter (2011). Response to "Could Pam Reynolds Hear?" Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 30, issue 1, pp 29-53 (this guy blabbers a lot). (d) Woerlee (2011). Rejoinder to Response to "Could Pam Reynolds Hear?" Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 30, issue 1, pp 54-61. (e) Dr. Jeffrey Long, a fierce proponent of the survivalist interpretation, told me, “I’ve never felt Pam’s NDE was anywhere near as evidential as it has been represented, as her OBE observations correspond to the time that they were trying to start the vascular access lines, and there is no chance that was at the time her body was in hypothermic arrest. Having said that, it takes time for auditory filtering to happen, and 100 decibel clicks are on the extreme end of what you could ignore under any circumstances. I find it almost inconceivable that Pam did not hear the clicks, but did hear conversation, unless she was OBE. I have to agree with Gerald [Woerlee] that her ability to hear that song may be anesthetic awareness. ” (Personal email communication, February 28, 2011) On the Missing Dentures case, see Smit, RH; Rivas, T. (2010) Rejoinder to “Response to ‘Corroboration of the Dentures Anecdote Involving Veridical Perception in a Near-Death Experience’” Journal of Near Death Studies vol 28, issue 4, p 193-205. General overviews (pro and con): Sudduth (2016) A Philosophical Critique of Empirical Arguments for Postmortem Survival,  Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion (chapter 3) Carter (2010) Science and the Near Death Experience: How Consciousness Survives Death, published by Inner Traditions. This is part 2 of Carter’s trilogy on psi and science. This book covers most (albeit not all) of the non-paranormal naturalistic models and explains their shortcomings. It also covers some of the proposed veridical cases and argues that the skeptical literature has unfairly assessed (at least some of) these cases. Carter is a frequent contributor to the Journal of Near Death Studies. Kelly and Kelly et al. (2007) Irreducible Mind: Towards a Psychology for the 21st Century, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (chapter 6). Braude (2003) Immortal Remains: The Evidence for Life After Death, Rowman and Littlefield Publisherd, Inc. (chapter 8) (ETC ETC ETC) Pro and con articles: (a) Augustine (2007). Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs? Journal of Near Death Studies, Vol 25, issue 4, pp 203-236. Available in its entirety for free at https://tinyurl.com/yawy77q8 Abstract: “While most near-death researchers have disregarded reports of near-death experiences (NDEs) with hallucinatory features, many have sought cases of veridical paranormal perception during NDEs. But despite more than a quarter century of near-death studies, no compelling evidence that NDErs can obtain information from remote locations during their NDEs has been forthcoming. This paper, Part I of a critique of survivalist interpretations of NDEs, reviews the quality of the evidence for veridical observations during NDEs, and finds the case for veridical paranormal perception during NDEs wanting.” (b) Greyson (2007). Comments on “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?” Journal of Near Death Studies, vol 25, issue 4, pp 237-244. (c) Clark (2007). The Other Shoe Drops: Commentary on “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?” Ibid (too lazy to write the same Journal vol an d issue), pp 245-250. (d) Tart (2007) Commentary on “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?” Ibid, pp 251-256. (e) Sabom (2007) Commentary on “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?” Ibid 257-260. (f) Augustine (2007) “Does Paranormal Perception Occur in NDEs?" Defended. Ibid, pp 261-283. Abstract: “Four preceding commentaries present a variety of criticisms of ‘Does Paranormal Perception Occur in Near-Death Experiences?’: that most near-death researchers do not interpret near-death experiences (NDEs) as evidence for life after death; that near-death researchers never appeal to NDE accounts incorporating predictable or uncorroborated details as evidence for veridical paranormal perception during NDEs; that reliable data contradict my critique of near-death veridicality studies; that it is unscientific to suggest a role for embellishment in NDE reports; that the patient in the Maria's shoe case reported veridical details that she could not have learned about through conventional means; and that my critique of the Pam Reynolds case amounts to an ‘a priori dismissal’ of features suggesting veridical paranormal perception or consciousness in the absence of brain activity. I respond to each of these and other criticisms in kind.” etc etc etc etc etc etc

I'm perplexed as to why this video has so many likes. Tim Maudlin is indeed an excellent and skilled philosopher, and his arguments and lectures usually merit serious consideration, but on *this* issue he really dropped the ball.

He starts off by saying that this question of whether absolute non-being is possible-- of why there is existence rather than non-existence-- lacks a satisfactory answer. There just *isn't* a satisfactory answer to give or receive, says Maudlin.

Then, after some prompting from Kuhn, Maudlin tells us that mathematical and moral values could not be different no matter how different the physical world were. This leads Kuhn to suggest that these are therefore "necessary" truths, and Maudlin seems to agree that they are.

This then leads Kuhn to suggest that Maudlin is, on his own view, therefore committed to a category of "necessary existence." Here Maudlin seems to get confused as to what Kuhn means. But this isn't a confusing question; the question is whether there is any actual aspect of reality that has to exist and could fail to exist, and relatedly, whether there are truths that cannot be fail to obtain. If Maudlin isn't confident one way or another, he could have just said that. There is a fact of the matter, even if we disagree on it.

If Maudlin says "no" -- if he thinks that there isn't an aspect of reality that is non-contingent/necessary -- then he would be insinuating (if not outright asserting) that the contingent physical realm just IS the totality of reality.

In that case, the question becomes whether the physical realm *has* to exist-- whether the non-existence of physical reality is possible. Here Maudlin seems confused by what we mean by "possible," but, as before, this really shouldn't be confusing. Another phrasing would be the following: Could *all* physical reality *fail* to exist? This question is coherent/intelligible, even if Maudlin isn't confident in any answer.

If Maudlin wants to say that, no, physical reality could not fail to exist, then he'd be claiming that the answer to the original question -- why is there anything at all -- is to be found within the nature of physical reality itself; i.e. that physical reality, or at least some aspect of physical reality, exists by a necessity of its own nature. This answer is intelligible, even if false. If Maudlin goes this route then he appears to be "satisfied" with it.

This is arguably implausible though. Leaving aside questions concerning the finitude of the past (which WLC dwells on), one could still argue like Leibniz or Pruss or Feser that physical reality is contingent even if its past is beginningless. See Pruss's chapter in the 2009 Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology and also chapter 2 of Ed Feser's 2017 book "Five Proofs." Perhaps they're mistaken though. I won't spell it all out here.

  Going back to Maudlin's idea that moral and mathematical values are somehow "not physical" and "couldn't be different" even if physics were different, this notion seems to imply that indeed some aspect of reality *is* non-physical and non-contingent, otherwise Maudlin would just be wrong when he says that these truths wouldn't change regardless of how much physical reality were changed. Kuhn sees this, although his way of expressing it may have confused Maudlin. He hints at it by asking Maudlin whether the laws of physics *have* to exist. He wants to know whether moral and mathematical truths would "exist" in the *absence* of all physical reality, including the laws of physics. If there were NO physical reality at all -- if there were NO laws of physics, no subatomic particles at all (no quarks, no photons, etc), no strings at all, no fields at all, etc. -- would mathematical or moral truths still exist? Would *anything* still exist?

Maudlin may not be confident in any answer, but the question is intelligible and there is a fact of the matter. And if he wants to argue that *none* of the answers are viable then he needs to engage Pruss and Feser on the theistic side and perhaps someone like Vilenkin on the atheistic side.

Polytheism vs classical theism (25% done)

Following  Aquinas’s example, visualize a hand pushing a stick, and that stick in turn is pushing a big rock, which In turn is pushing a medium sized rock, which is pushing a small rock. The medium sized rock is borrowing or deriving its “power” to push from the bigger rock, which is borrowing its power to push from the stick, which is borrowing from the hand. It’s all occurring at once. Scotus calls this an "essentially ordered series," Aquinas calls it a "per se series," and Feser calls it a hierarchical regress. 

A hierarchical regress is different from a linear/temporal regress. A temporal series is an example of what Scotus calls "an accidentally ordered series" and Aquinas calls a "per accidens series," which is a series wherein later members don't depend on earlier members. In contrast, a hierarchical regress occurs right here and right now, and is one in which the members depend on a logically-prior member (explained more below). Visualize a similar hierarchical regress occurring within the totality/fabric of reality itself— one level of reality depending on a logically/explanatorily prior level, which depends on yet a prior level, etc. all at once.

 Again, this isn’t necessarily about contemporary states depending on past states; that’s not what “prior” means in a hierarchical regress. Imagine that the hand in the aforementioned example has been pushing the stick since eternity past, with the series of past events/movements having no beginning in time. In that case, we could still say that the movement of the hand is logically or explanatorily prior to the movement of the stick. Or, following Kant, imagine that a heavy ball has been resting on a cushion for eternity-- or opposite extreme, imagine the ball resting on the cushion timelessly -- in either case we could still maintain that the weight and roundness of the ball are logically/explanatorily prior to the indentation in the cushion. Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Edward Feser (eg 2008, 2017 among others), David Bentley Hart (2014), Rasmussen (2018, 2019 among others), etc. (Koons, Pruss, Kerr, etc) would argue that even an eternal universe with no beginning would still be contingent and dependent in similar ways and would still involve explanatory hierarchical regresses at any and every moment. 

Classical theism says that the hierarchical regress--or the series of explanations that derive or borrow their explanatory capacity from a logically-prior explanation-- must have a bottom level, which is the First Member or First Cause or First Explanation (regardless of whether time has a beginning). It would be the equivalent of the hand in that example of the hand pushing the stick etc. but in this case at the deepest level of reality. 

(The example of the hand pushing the stick can cause confusion if one imagines the hand approaching the stick and then picking it up, which would involve temporal changes in time. Instead, conceive of something akin to gears all moving at once. Or, in Feser's example, imagine a book resting on a coffee table which is in the floor etc wherein the explanation and the effect being explained occur together simultaneously.)

 Classical theism calls that first member of the hierarchical series of reality "God." Traditionally, classical theists argue that the First Member of the hierarchical regress of reality must be indivisible (just One), without parts (so can’t be material), fully actual without any potentiality requiring actualization a la Feser or Aristotle (which also rules out more than one since differentiation requires different members to have potentialities that the others lack), and must possess—or just be—intellect, will, etc. There are sophisticated arguments for these attributes (with rejoinders...) by the aforementioned authors with serious rigor, but most atheists (and believers alike) are simply ignorant of the literature. I won't detail their arguments in this post but strongly encourage reading their academic work. Again, an infinite past would be irrelevant. Imagine an infinite series of mirrors each reflecting the image of a face. Each mirror is deriving its image from a explanatorily-prior mirror, but an infinite number of mirrors still could not account for the image of the face, which must exist outside of the series. 

POLYTHEISM AND GOD OF THE GAPS

In contrast to classical theism, the gods of polytheism would be more like the stick, or the large/medium sized rocks, or the mirrors; they (the gods of polytheism) occur later in the explanatory series. Arguments for/against classical theism are mostly different from arguments for/against the gods of polytheism. So e.g. the arguments for classical theism based on the principle of sufficient reason/PSR (I prefer "ubiquity of intelligibility"), the contingency of physical reality, the reality of the actualization of potential in Aquinas and Feser, mathematical realism and the problem of universals, etc. would not be arguments for polytheism. And, similarly, arguments *against* polytheism based on science (eg we no longer invoke Zeus to explain lightning) are *not* arguments against classical theism. Relatedly, debunking "god of the gaps" arguments (I.e. debunking arguments that use “God” to plug up holes in our current scientific understanding) is not the same as debunking classical theism, because the latter is a philosophical/metaphysical concept about what (if anything) grounds the very possibility of the existence of the domain studied by science. Worthy non-believing/Atheistic philosophers include Graham Oppy, Jl Mackie, Alex Malpass, William Rowe, and others. Worthy believing philosophers were mentioned earlier. Below is a list of publications from both sides of the debate that ought to be read by anyone interested in natural theology.

CosmicSkeptic vs kalam cosmological argument

Alex O'Connor is a brilliant young man known on YoutTube as CosmicSkeptic. His channel is devoted to worthwhile intellectual discussions of various philosophical topics, but most notably natural theology and the ethics of meat-eating.

In 2017 Alex posted a critique of William Lane Craig's kalam cosmological argument (which Craig defends here and here among other places). Unfortunately, as Alex now realizes, his initial critique made several huge mistakes which he discusses in a recent video in which he critiques himself! While I appreciate his honesty and intelligence (as well as his kindness), and while his "debunking" of his own video is very good overall, I found a few issues that I wanted to address here.

First, around the 14:40 mark Alex mostly accurately summarizes the key argument for the personhood of the cause, but he’s still using the wrong terminology; Alex asks how a finite universe can come from an infinite cause and wonders, if the infinite cause is sufficient, then why isn’t the effect likewise infinite.

But when applied to the universe, “finite” and “infinite” are mathematical concepts, but “infinite” is NOT mathematical when applied to the cause, so there’s some unintentional equivocating going on here. WLC puts it like this: if the cause of the universe is timeless and permanent, then, if it’s also sufficient, why isn’t the effect likewise timeless/permanent? It’s all about a temporal origin from a timeless and sufficient cause. WLC asks us to imagine an beginning-less past wherein the temperature has always been below freezing. In this case, it’s silly to think that water would begin to freeze. Any water that was around would have been frozen from eternity past. WLC, following earlier Islamic and Christian philosophers, argues that the only way out of this dilemma is to suggest that the timeless cause in itself isn’t sufficient; its free decision to create is sufficient. Similarly, WLC, asks us to imagine (for sake of clarity and not literalness) a man sitting down timelessly and willing to stand up. The choice to stand makes the beginning of time.

Alex nevertheless manages to communicate the basic gist of the arguments, but his use of “infinite” here is a bit sloppy because he’s applying it to both the universe (where it’s mathematical) and the cause of the universe (where’s it’s qualitative rather than quantitative). 

(These points are discussed in references below, including the cited 2015 lecture and the Blackwell Companion)

Second, although Alex's original video claims that Aquinas argues for a beginning of the universe, and although the new video is supposed to critique the original, Alex still hasn’t explicitly acknowledged that Aquinas did not argue for a beginning of any universe. Thomistic scholars like Edward Feser have repeatedly clarified this point (e.g. here), to no avail. Alex does say that he misstated Aquinas but doesn't explain how. Aquinas believed in a temporal beginning on religious grounds, but he did not argue for it. Rather, he differentiates between a linear/temporal beginning of the universe (what he calls an accidentally ordered series) on the one hand, and then on the other hand a hierarchical (or essentially ordered) series that occurs here and now. Aquinas grants the possibility of a beginning-less accidentally ordered series for the sake of argument but then uses philosophical arguments against an infinite hierarchical series. Finally,  around 22:45 Alex claims that WLC does not regard the big bang as indicative of an absolute beginning but instead argues for such a beginning via philosophical arguments. This is partly mistaken. It’s true that WLC’s primary arguments for the finitude of the past are philosophical rather than scientific-- e.g. alleged absurdities ensuing from actual infinities and the impossibility of traversing infinity via successive addition, with the latter requiring WLC's defense of the A-theory of time (here, here, and here). But WLC also does argue that contemporary cosmology strongly points to an absolute beginning even if there’s a multiverse or cyclic model. See his chapter on the kalam (coauthored with a physicist) in the 2009 Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, or his 2014 debate with Carroll (where both men failed IMO-- see a review by Barnes, Wall, and Cram here), or his 2015 lecture at University of Birmingham in England, etc. PS. For the record, I am not convinced by WLC's arguments for the kalam.

Derren Brown vs psi

In this otherwise-exceptional Svengali video (at the 50:00 mark), the highly-skilled illusionist and brilliant skeptic Derren Brown explains why clairvoyance doesn't exist. "Of course it doesn't," he asserts. His reasoning/evidence? The participants from the audience (who never claimed to have had any clairvoyant experiences and did not previously demonstrate clairvoyance under experimental conditions) lo and behold failed to exhibit any clairvoyance on stage. Those people (on stage), under those circumstances, were unable to show any clairvoyance. That's it. That's Derren's argument against the possibility (or at least for the extreme unlikelihood) of clairvoyance.

Unfortunately, he is very ignorant of the psi literature. I strongly encourage Derren to read the following (among others that should be included at some point):

-- Cardena, E. (2018). The experimental evidence for parapsychological phenomena: A review. American Psychologist, volume 73, issue, 5, p 663-677. (official journal of the APA)

-- Storm et al (2010). A meta-analysis with nothing to hide: Reply to Hyman (2010), Psychological Bulletin, Volume 136, Issue 4, Jul 2010, pages 491-494. (This paper is on their prior work in the area of Ganzfeld and Ray Hyman's objections to it, which isn't what Derren was talking about, but I thought I'd share it since he also touches on ways to fake/simulate the appearance of telepathy)


-- Hodgson, R. (1892) A record of Observations of Certain Phenomena of Trance, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, volume 8, pages 1-167;


-- Hodgson, R. (1898) A Further Record of Observations of Certain Phenomena of Trance, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, volume 13, pages 284-582


-- Braude's 2003 book "Immortal Remains" (here) and Sudduth's 2016 book "A Philosophical Critique of Empirical Arguments for Postmortem Survival" (here). Both books are surprisingly skeptical, with Braude claiming that the survival hypothesis just barely beats the best alternative and Sudduth claiming that the best alternative is at least equally plausible. Sudduth is ultimately unconvinced by the evidence, but he and Braude both agree that the best alternative explanation of the relevant data is a (non-afterlife) paranormal interpretation (psi functioning among living people that mimics the appearance of an afterlife). In other words, the best and strongest cases that survivalists offer as evidence for an afterlife cannot be explained away with stereotypical mundane physicalist scenarios. Instead, if one wants to remain a skeptic of the afterlife, then one must conclude that these cases involve psychic functioning among living people. Braude and Sudduth's summaries of the cases are fair, accurate, and clear.
Here's the gist: The most Derren has demonstrated is that these particular individuals, under these particular circumstances, did not produce any psi effects. This is no more impressive than demonstrating that particular football players, under very particular circumstances, cannot score touchdowns. The latter merely states the obvious, whereas the former poses a serious challenge to the reality of psi effects only if we grant (ahead of time) certain assumptions about when and why psi effects occur, assumptions that are not consistent with reports from the general population and (since those reports don't prove anything) also with many the methodologically-sound studies that Derren has never refuted or even mentioned.

To further elaborate on the football example, Braude (2014) has offered a helpful conceptual analysis on whether we should categorize psi effects as universally-distributed capacities (like the capacity to breathe) or instead as abilities or skills. These aren't word games; how we conceptualize psi effects influences our expectations on when these effects should be observed and when their absence should be taken as proof of their non-existence. But not every man can produce an erection on the spot in front of hundreds or thousands of people (many porn stars can't even do that!), not every baseball player can score a homerun in every play, and (to connect abilities/skills with capacities:) not every swimmer can hold their breath for the same length of time in every race. None of this counts as evidence against the existence of the capacity/ability/skill in question. Again, the only way for Derren to reasonably interpret his failure to demonstrate clairvoyance as proof against the existence of clairvoyance is if we grant (ahead of time) certain assumptions about its natural history and about when/why it occurs, but these assumptions betray reports from the general public as well as sound data to the contrary. See Braude's 2014 book "Crimes of Reason" for in-depth discussions on these and related issues.

I genuinely respect and appreciate his work, but Derren really dropped the ball here. While one can find experts on both sides of the debate, it seems that Derren rarely (if ever) interviews actual experts who disagree with him (rather than buffoons like "medium" Joe Power, who is a fraud in my own opinion).

The status quo of atheism vs theism, with emphasis on the atheist side

In my last post I criticized christian apologist Ravi Zecharias for trying to reverse the anti-theistic argument from evil as an ironic argument for the existence of God. Zecharias alleges that the argument presupposes a background of objective morality (independent of human opinion) by which we can judge various acts and situations as "evil," which then raises the question of what is the best candidate for grounding objective moral values. I criticized Zecharias for missing a version of the argument that doesn't presuppose objective morality. He simply doesn't even mention it, let alone refute it. 

But in this post I want to instead criticize some anti-theistic arguments that were addressed to me on the Instagram page of Christian apologist (and debate moderator) Cameron Bertuzzi, who recently posted a picture of the book "Two Dozen Arguments for God" edited by Walls and Dougherty. One atheist commented on the picture claiming to be able to "logically disprove the existence of God." I was very intrigued and asked them to do so. Some time went by without any response, and so I gently nudged/reminded that person about their comment.

Still no response from that person. That's fine; people don't have to indulge me if they don't want to. However, another atheist replied back to me by saying, "I can!" (I.e. "I can logically disprove God"). I asked them to please do so, and what follows are their two replies to me (which are somewhat redundant, but I'd rather share both of their initial replies).

Here, in full, are their two replies to my request that they logically disprove the existence of God.

[QUOTE] Every God in human history was fabricated to fill in knowledge gaps. For example, we didn't know what causes lighting, we made up zeus and thor. Now we don't know what happened before the big bang and after out death and we give credits to a God. 2nd, there is no proof that a God exists. The Bible is the claim, not the proof. 3rd, there have been more that 20.000 gods in human history? How are you sure that yours is correct? Now give me a reason that God is true [SECOND  COMMENT:] The fact that there is a lack of evidence alone should debunk theism, or religions .Especially when theism is always there to fill in knowledge gaps. Every time science found out how something that was accredited to God works, a God dies, just like zeus, thor and a lot of deities. And that's the same that happens now. We don't know what happens when we die (or we can't accept that nothing happens and everything will be like it was before we were born), so we have some Gods like the Christian God who sents you to heaven and hell, and other gods doing different things. I can't completely debunk theism, but i can debunk every religion that exists on earth. Also, 99% of people's religious beliefs are dependent of the place they are born, which means that(if there is a God, there is only one) you will believe in the true God only if you happen to be born in a certain place. [-- END OF QUOTATION] 

I really don't mean to single out or pick on this person in particular, but I singled out his replies because they perfectly capture what I regard as standard atheist rebuttals, not just online but also among the general public. These kinds of comments are usually what I encounter, although I should also clarify that, in my experience, the typical believer doesn't fare any better in the other direction! The status quo of theist-vs-atheist debates is very disappointing.

(Also, I should note that there are some atheist philosophers of religion who provide much better arguments and assessments, such as JL Mackie, William Rowe, Graham Oppy, and others. I don't mean to dismiss their work, but in fact have learned a lot from them.)

So my plan here is to share my response so that I can refer back to this link in the future in order to clear up misunderstandings without having to repeat myself. I'll go through the arguments one at a time. Everything below the line is my response to the atheist above. With some links added to the embedded text. 

===========================================================

My reply may sound harsh, but I sincerely do not intend any offense. I’m also going to repeat much of what I’ve said elsewhere. You’re talking as if serious philosophers of religion haven’t already anticipated (and thought about/through) your objections. You’re also talking to me as if I haven’t, but I’m an agnostic who *obsesses* over these questions. You’re also commenting on a picture of pro-theism book edited by (and with contributions from) academic philosophers who’ve thought long and hard about your objections a who have put forth several arguments in favor of theism, but you’ve failed to engage (or even mention!) these arguments. If you’ve actually read the book then please post a review. Also, it’s quite silly to expect somebody to convince you of theism via discussion in the Instagram comments section. 

 Every God in human history was fabricated to fill in knowledge gaps. For example, we didn't know what causes lighting, we made up zeus and thor. Now we don't know what happened before the big bang and after out death and we give credits to a God. Every time science found out how something that was accredited to God works, a God dies, just like zeus, thor and a lot of deities. And that's the same that happens now. 

These are examples of (polytheistic) gods being offered a sort of (pseudo) scientific hypothesis later replaced by a more accurate scientific understanding. You cited these examples as if they somehow pose a challenge to (or at least place doubt upon) classical theism. 
However:

(1) We need to clear up ongoing confusions over concepts. Classical theism is not and has never been a scientific proposal and is also qualitatively (not merely quantitatively) different from the concept of polytheism. Science restricted to the/ our spacetime arena (and even then, only some aspects of the spacetime arena), whereas classical theism is about what (IF anything) the spacetime arena is contingent upon. The gods of polytheism are conceptualized as (a) contingent entities (b) within the universe, (c) with an origin of their own, and as (d) existing alongside natural objects. This narrative is precisely what classical theism denies about God. The fact that both concepts can be discussed using the word “god” causes some very unfortunate confusion. We may need to talk about the concept of classical theism using a different word. 

Classical theism (and even non-classical but still traditional monotheism) says that all of reality—including the collection of other and all spacetime arenas /multiverse—is contingent upon and reducible to (and perhaps even emanates from) a single indivisible Source, which is itself not contingent upon or reducible to anything else. Classical theism goes further by insisting that this Source has (or, depending on who you ask, perhaps just is) consciousness. Classical theism concerns the ground of reality, or the ground of being, or the bottom level of reality, whereas polytheism concerns entities that are contingent upon this prior ground of being. 

Feel free to disagree or be skeptical, but also be sure to familiarize yourself with the arguments in favor of this position (which I’ll mention later). Some of these arguments were developed under the assumption that the universe is eternal and beginningless, so your quip about the Big Bang is completely irrelevant. The arguments aren’t susceptible to scientific evidence for a grand eternal megaverse.

(Note: When I said everything is “reducible” to this Source I didn’t mean physically reducible) 

(2) The gods of polytheism are (at least mostly) examples of pseudo-scientific hypotheses used to fill in gaps within our scientific knowledge, but the philosophical arguments for classical theism aren’t susceptible to scientific confirmation or disconfirmation. Again, this is a philosophical concept and isn’t susceptible to scientific confirmation or disconfirmation, even in principle. It’s not a scientific question AT ALL, so no amount of scientific discovery can undermine it. You need to deal specifically with the philosophical arguments. I’m sorry for being redundant, but this point can’t be overemphasized given the constant misunderstanding, which is sometimes peddled by ignorant believers themselves. Nonetheless, what I’m describing is the God of the early church, Aquinas, Augustine, St John (most likely), the author of Genesis (most likely), Ed Feserm the Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox Church, David Bentley Hart, etc. In fact, many of the standard arguments for classical theism are grounded in a philosophical framework that is arguably presupposed by any possible science (see this and this for expositions on this point). 

Quick side note: Classical theism isn’t the same as theistic personalism, which is what you find in works by William Lane Craig, Alvin Plangtinga, Gregory Boyd, etc. (see here, here, here, etc) But these two versions of God have enough of an overlap that the aforementioned points about polytheism vs monotheism still apply.

there is no proof that a God exists.  

There are a variety of worthwhile philosophical arguments that, if sound, take you to an indivisible Source of all contingent reality with additional side arguments suggesting that it may be conscious. But perhaps the arguments are not sound. I’m still trying to figure it out for myself. Either way, some of the arguments are at least worth reflecting on. 

 The Bible is the claim, not the proof. 

Who’s talking about the Bible? Most Christian philosophers of religion do NOT make pro-theistic arguments based on the Bible. In fact, some Christian philosophers (including WLC!) will grant, for the sake of the argument, that the gospels may contain historical errors and even some myth. They argue that, using the standard methods /approaches of conventional historiography, one can nevertheless make a case for the historicity of the person of Jesus, the empty tomb, and his postmortem appearances (with some atheists granting this point, but then explaining these in naturalistic terms, like the last chapter of this book). I’m not agreeing with them or endorsing their views. My point is that this is the closest they come to using the Bible in an argument. Otherwise their arguments are not based on scripture at all. See here, here (and watch Q/A), here, and here for more on the resurrection debate.

Unless we’re talking about naïve YECs. But YECs are usually not academic philosophers. I’m talking about (and Cameron’s post is talking about) philosophers of religion who offer purely philosophical arguments...

Now give me a reason that God is true

 I’m agnostic, but Feser’s versions of the arguments from change and PSR, the neoplatonic argument, the Augustinian argument, etc (e.g. here, here, here, etc). IMO these are among the most interesting arguments. David Bentley Hart’s version of the argument from contingency is also pretty good, although not as rigorous or formal as Feser. 

I think the moral argument is weak because it relies entirely on intuition, but if it were to go through then IMO it would take you *either* theism or Wielenberg’s godless normative realism, unless I’m missing something (which is possible). Here is a debate between WLC and Wielenberg on theism vs godless normative realism. Though, again, I don’t (yet?) accept the moral argument. I’m just sharing my own views with you.

IMO the kalam argument is weak because it presupposes a tensed theory of time, which seems like a hard case to make given certain findings from special and general relativity—although WLC has indeed gone to *great* lengths to argue for the tensed theory elsewhere, such as his “Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination,”, his “Tenseless Theory of time: A Critical Examination,” and his “Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity.” However, the physicist James Fodor has written a very extensive and damning critique of WLC’s arguments in chapter two of his book “Unreasonable Faith: How William Lane Craig Overstates the Case for Christianity.” I’m still trying to decide for myself on this issue, but leaving heavily towards Fodor’s position. There is a purely philosophical version of the kalam based solely on the alleged impossibility of an actually-infinite number of things. See pages 103-125 of the 2009 Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, or p 4-35 in the book “Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology” co-authored with atheist philosopher Quentin Smith. WLC’s lectures are not as in depth as his academic written work, but click here for a lecture that covers a slice of his work (I copied the url at the time when Craig begins his philosophical discussion of the infinite).

IF WLC is right about the tensed theory of time and about the actual infinite, and IF the PSR is true, then I think the philosophical considerations in WLC’s more academic formulations of the kalam would indeed take you back to a first Source that is personal. But, again, I’m skeptical of these steps. Also, consider how WLC’s presentism may undermine his own arguments about infinity. Still, IMO, the standard internet atheist rebuttals to the kalam are pretty bad, and I say that as a skeptic myself. 

In any case, YOU posted these comments on the picture that Cameron posted--a picture of Walls and Dougherty’s book on “Two Dozen Arguments for God”— so YOU should engage the arguments contained in the book. Have you even read it? I’m not endorsing it by the way.

 We don't know what happens when we die (or we can't accept that nothing happens and everything will be like it was before we were born)

See Braude’s 2003 book and Sudduth’s 2016 critique of the empirical arguments for an afterlife. Braude concludes that the scales are just barely tipped in favor of the afterlife interpretation of the best cases, while Sudduth is ultimately more skeptical and thinks that the best alternative interpretation is at least equally plausible (if not more so). But both books provide very nice and charitable overviews of the evidence, some of which is pretty damn good, at least for something paranormal going on. Sudduth is absolutely persuasive that the strongest “afterlife” cases can’t be dismissed with the mundane and stereotypical physicalist interpretations; the best alternative interpretation is itself a (non-afterlife) paranormal interpretation (living agent psi/LAP hypothesis). I’m agnostic on the afterlife, but some of these cases have played a role in convincing me that psi phenomena occur.

In any case, an afterlife wouldn’t imply theism and theism doesn’t imply an afterlife, but I understand your point about theists tricking themselves into accepting theism because it erases their fear of death. I get the point, and it’s worth reflecting on. 

Also, 99% of people's religious beliefs are dependent of the place they are born  

Yes, good point. Though, it’s also true that people are more/less likely to accept evolution and the theories of relativity depending on where they’re born, which has no bearing on whether these ideas are correct. 

which means that(if there is a God, there is only one) you will believe in the true God only if you happen to be born in a certain place.

Yes, and that’s irritating and has relevance to the idea that God would arrange for people to suffer eternal torment for failing to have the right beliefs before dying, but it has no relevance to whether or not the philosophical arguments for classical theism go through. 

Also, just for the record, some Christian philosophers and theologians (including "Bible believing" Christians) have made what I regard as persuasive arguments for a form of Christ-mediated universalsim whereby everyone who has ever lived will be reconciled to God and to each other in heaven because of Jesus. See here, here, here, and here. Also see this forthcoming book. 

A lot more could and should be said, but my reply is already too long. 

Ravi Zecharias and the problem of evil

Ravi Zecharias recently appeared on The Sunday Special hosted by Ben Shapiro of the Daily Wire. Here is a clip of Ravi talking about the infamous problem of evil for believers in traditional monotheism. (Everything below was originally written as YouTube comment, but it was too long so I decided to move it here. Keep in mind that this is not a formal academic essay, so I did not fill in the sorts of details and analyses that I would in something more formal. There are links added to highlighted words that will take you to more detailed expositions. Below is just a glorified YouTube comment...)

Ravi invites the audience to think more clearly about what it means to complain about the existence of "evil" in the first place. The skeptic (the person skeptical of theism) is absolutely right in denouncing evil wherever and whenever it occurs. But what is "evil"? Ravi's point seems to be that skeptics are highlighting examples of things/events/actions that they regard as objectively wrong-- they deviate from objectively binding standards. These things are wrong regardless of human opinion (e.g. rape). Ravi goes on to suggest that if something can be objectively wrong in this sense then it implies that things can be objectively good, and these together imply the existence of a standard that transcends human opinion or imagination, which (Ravi argues) implies some sort of higher order law. Ravi suggests that this in turn requires a moral law giver.

So Ravi turns the argument back against the skeptics as a way of unintentionally arguing for the existence of God, given the premise that actually-objective moral values exist.

Here the skeptic must be honest and acknowledge that the existence of actually-objective moral values cries out for explanation, either in terms of theism, Wielenberg's godless normative realism (i.e. "moral platonism"), or maybe something else. For the sake of argument, let's grant that monotheism definitely has an explanatory advantage here.

(Click here for a good debate on the Euthyphro dilemma, which IMO fails as a serious challenge to modified divine command theory). However, I would argue that Ravi et al (as brilliant as they may be) have missed a yet deeper problem involved here. A skeptic does not have to cite objectively-evil things in order to run a successful PoE argument. We don't need to ask about the co-existence of objective evil with the all-loving God of traditional monotheism. Instead, a skeptic could argue that that the existence of gratuitous suffering (not objective evil, but gratuitous suffering) is inconsistent with the God of traditional monotheism. The argument may still fail, but it's not vulnerable to Ravi's rebuttal here. Here's a different way of phrasing it: A skeptic needn't invoke objective moral evil, but instead may argue that there is an internal tension or an internal inconsistency within the system(s) of traditional monotheism-- this system says that God is simultaneously (1) all-loving or omnibenevolent, which arguably entails wanting the best for his creation and creatures, or at the very least entails that God would not want his creatures to suffer gratuitously (2) all-powerful, which prima facie seems to entail having the power to bring about the best for his creation and (3) omniscient, which seems to entail knowing how to bring about the best for his creation. Ravi adds (4) that God is all-sovereign which arguably is slightly different from (2). But this last point isn't too relevant. In any case, the internal inconsistency concerns the following: (5) Gratuitous suffering exists Notice that (5) doesn't require objective evil in order for the argument to go through. In other words, citing the problem of evil does not require that the skeptic is committed to the existence of objective moral values, and it's also not the case that the skeptic's lack of belief in objective moral values somehow weakens the skeptic's argument. The real issue (or at least another issue) is whether or not the system of traditional monotheism contains within itself an internal inconsistency or tension.
At this point Ravi may be inclined to argue that free will explains much of the suffering, even if it's gratuitous, because free will can be used for evil. (We can get into the intrinsic value of free will and how it applies to this debate if need be, but let's just grant this point to Ravi) In order for a person to be able to freely choose the good then he/she must by the same logic be able to choose bad, including the bad choices of inflicting suffering on others. God won't intervene because doing so would violate their sacred free will. To be fair, what I just wrote is a pathetic summary of the richer free will defenses in the literature, but my point is that for the sake of argument I am granting Ravi the free will defense as far as it goes. Let's just give it to him.

However, this too misses the mark, because it completely and utterly fails to account for the gratuitous suffering of conscious animals (non-human animals) that die slow and agonizing deaths in naturally-occurring forest fires, drownings, predation, etc. It also wouldn't explain the existence of naturally-occurring diseases from parasites, fungi, viruses, etc-- free will doesn't cause animal suffering or disease. Nor could any person's free will cause a six year old child to have bone cancer. At this point Ravi may wish to claim that Adam and Eve's sin caused these natural evils by directly changing the fabric of reality (somehow), resulting in a transformation of the laws of physics, etc. But Adam and Eve, even if they existed, were most certainly not the first human beings, period; the science here is persuasive to anyone except the most closed minded YECs. Extreme animal suffering and diseases were occurring long before (and still long after) humans first came on the scene, and, once more, no human's free will could explain naturally-occurring bone cancer in six year old children.

So, prima facie, there is an internal inconsistency in the concept of traditional monotheism as conceived and outlined by Ravi himself. One does not need to appeal to actually-objective moral evils to make the point. There may be a rebuttal to everything I just said, but Ravi didn't even address this deeper problem, which is unaffected by his analysis. tl;dr: Ravi's response doesn't account for why an all-powerful, all-loving, sovereign God would allow gratuitous suffering in nature -- animals suffering from naturally-occurring ailments and situations, human children getting leukemia, etc. Again, the skeptic doesn't have to label these things "objectively evil" in order for the argument to have force. The idea is rather that there is an internal inconsistency within the system of traditional monotheism, regardless of whether or not these instances of gratuitous suffering are objectively evil.